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Abstract
Using laboratory experimental data, we test the uncertainty of social state transitions in various
competing environments of fixed paired two-person constant sum 2× 2 games. It firstly shows that,
the distributions of social strategy transitions are not erratic but obey the principle of the maximum
entropy (MaxEnt). This finding indicates that human subject social systems and natural systems
could share wider common backgrounds.
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FIG. 1. Payoff Matrix of a Constant Sum Game. A, B, C and D are the payoffs for row player under four combinations of two
player’s strategies respectively and S-A, S-B, S-C and S-D are for column player respectively. S denotes the sum of the payoffs
to the two players.
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) is introduced by Jaynes [19], rooting in Boltzmann, Gibbs and
Shannon [20, 26]. As a methodology, MaxEnt has gained its wide applications in natural science and engineering.
The advantage of this methodology is to provide rich information based on very limit information. In economics,
MaxEnt approach has also gained its wide applications, e.g., in market equilibrium [2, 28], in wealth and income
distribution [9, 31], in firm growth rates [1] and in behavior modeling [30]. Theoretical interpreting or modeling of
the distributions of social outcomes with MaxEnt is growing.
Considering the importance of MaxEnt, to carry out laboratory experiments to investigate this fundamental rule
is necessary [15]. Only quite recently, entropy is firstly measured in experimental economics systems to evaluate
social outcomes by Bednar et.al. [4] and Cason et.al [7]. Then, Xu et.al., [36] find the human system in laboratory
fixed-paired two-person constant-sum 2 × 2 games obey the MaxEnt. To the best of our knowledge, these are almost
the total experimental works related to entropy or MaxEnt in social research field till now. In the first experimental
investigation in MaxEnt, Xu et.al. [36] focus on the static observable — distribution and the entropy. A direct
one-step-forward question is, in the experimental social interaction systems, whether the dynamic observable fits
MaxEnt or not?
Answering this question is the main aim of this report. The paper is organized as follow: section two describes the
relative notions; section three introduces the experiments and reports the experimental social transitions; section four
provides the MaxEnt prediction relating to the social transitions of the investigated experiments; section five reports
the results; Discussion and summary are at last.
II. RELATIVE NOTIONS
A. Two person constant sum 2× 2 game
Two-person zero-sum games describe situations in which two individuals are absolutely opposite to each other,
where one’s gain is always the other’s loss [21]. Constant sum game is strategically equivalent to zero sum games in
mathematical view.
In a two-person constant-sum game, each player has two strategies. For a row player, the strategy set is (U,D)
and for a column player, the strategy set is (L,R). The sum of the two players’ payoffs is the same for any outcome.
Let S denote the sum of the payoffs of the two players. Any constant sum 2 × 2 game can be written in the form
of Fig. 1. A, B, C and D is the payoff for row player under four combinations of two players’ strategies respectively
and S-A, S-B, S-C and S-D are for column player respectively. If (A > C) ∩ (B < D) ∩ (A > B) ∩ (C < D) or
(A < C)∩ (B > D)∩ (A < B)∩ (C > D) as in [25], there exists an unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE).
B. Social State and Observation
The social state xij [23] can be taken as the combination of two players’ strategies, herein i indicates the column
player’s strategy and j indicates the row player’s strategy. Let p be the probability of strategy R for column player
and q be the probability of strategy D for row player, the social state can be described by xij=(p, q). During a game,
each player chooses a pure strategy from his own strategy set in a round t, the combination of these two strategies can
be taken as a social state xt in that round, xt = (pt, qt). Obviously, there are altogether four possible social states
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FIG. 2. Transition distribution and aggregated transition. (a) four actual backward transitions T01←00, T01←01,T01←10, T01←11
for the given state x01 from x00, x01, x10, x11; the blue arrows indicate the directions of transitions; the numerics indicate
the frequencies of transitions, respectively; (b) the aggregated backward transition T¯− and related mean starting point x¯t−1
= (p¯t−1, q¯t−1) = (0.63, 0.69); (c) four expected backward transitions for x01 from four starting points x00, x01, x10, x11 with
MaxEnt, the blue arrows indicate the directions of transitions and the numerics indicate the related frequencies; (d) an example
which is not in agreement with MaxEnt but satisfies the aggregated backward transition constraint in (b);(e) four actual forward
transitions T01→00, T01→01, T01→10, T01→11 from x01, the red arrows indicate the directions of transitions, and the numerics
indicate the related actual frequencies of transitions; (f) the aggregated forward transition T¯+ and relative mean terminal point
x¯t+1 = (p¯t+1, q¯t+1) = (0.40, 0.45); (g) four MaxEnt expected forward transitions; (h) an example which is not in agreement
with MaxEnt but satisfies the actual aggregated forward transition constraint. Data in (a) and (e) comes from the experiment
— game 1.
in one round, i.e., (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1) indicating LU, LD, RU and RD respectively, and we simplify them as
x00, x01, x10, and x11. In Fig. 2(b) and (f), the gray dots present the social states.
If the game is repeated, observation denoted as Ωij at each state xij can be accumulated and the results of these
games are shown in the last 4 columns of Tab I.
C. Social transition
In this paper, we investigate the social transitions within the strategy states in the strategy space. In a repeated
game, for a given round t, the social state is xt = (pt, qt); similarly, the social state in the previous round can be
denoted as xt−1 := (pt−1, qt−1) and in the next round can be denoted as xt+1 := (pt+1, qt+1). For each given round
t, there exists the next round and previous round except the first round and last round in a experimental session.
So, there exists a social forward transition vector (denoted as T+) indicating the transition from xt to xt+1, and a
social backward transition vector (denoted as T−) indicating the transition from xt−1 to xt.
In a two-person 2×2 game, there are four social states, so there are all 32 transitions (shown in the first column in
Table II), including the 4 backward (forward) transitions for each of the 4 states. These 32 transitions should be the
samples for MaxEnt testing.
D. Distribution of Transitions of a Given State
During a game, for a given social state, there exists 4 forward transitions and 4 backward transitions, respectively.
This means that there should exist a distribution of transitions.
For example, Fig. 2 (a) is demonstrating the distribution of the transitions of the given state x01, in which the four
backward transitions T01←00, T01←01,T01←10 and T01←11 come from the four state x00, x01, x10 and x11, respectively;
the blue arrows indicate the directions of transitions and the numerics indicate the related actual frequencies. The
distribution of backward transitions T01←00, T01←01,T01←10, T01←11 are 55, 106, 78, and 193, respectively. Similarly,
Fig. 2 (e) illustrates the distribution of the forward transitions.
4E. Aggregated Transition of a State
The existence of distribution of transitions of a given state implicates that there are many backward starting points
and forward terminal points. So, for a given state xi0j0 , we can get a so-called the mean starting point x¯t−1=(p¯t−1, q¯t−1)
and a aggregated backward transition T¯− (it is natural that T¯−=xi0j0 − x¯t−1), and also the mean terminal point
x¯t+1 = (p¯t+1, q¯t+1) and a aggregated forward transition T¯+ (it is natural that T¯+=x¯t+1− xi0j0). The aggregated
forward transition T+ is the same as the experimental dynamics observable in literatures (called as change in a given
state in ref. [3] and the mean jump-out vector of a given state in ref [33]).
For example, supposing the given state is (0,1), Fig. 2 (b) illustrates the aggregated backward transition T¯−, as
the average of the four vectors in Fig. 2 (a), is (-0.63,0.31); Meanwhile the mean starting point x¯t−1=(0.63, 0.69); In
Fig. 2 (f), T¯+, as the average of the four vectors in Fig. 2 (e), is (0.40,-0.55) and then x¯t+1=(0.40, 0.45).
III. DATA SET AND EXPERIMENTAL TRANSITIONS
A. Experiments and Data set
Experimental economics methods are well suited to evaluate theories [15]. In this paper, we use the same data set
as ref [36] to test the MaxEnt in social strategy transitions. The two-person constant sum 2×2 game includes 11
different parameters (Table I). From game 1 to game 10, each game consists of 9 pairs of subjects, each pair play for
500 rounds while for game 11, the game consists of 12 pairs of subjects, each pair play for 300 rounds. These yield
4500 observed social states in each of game 1 to game 10 and 3600 observed social states in game 11 (for more detail,
see ref. [14, 36]).
TABLE I. Parameters and observations of the 11 game§
game A B C D S Group Rounds Ω00 Ω01 Ω10 Ω11
g1 77 35 8 48 100 9 500 994 433 1659 1405
g2 73 74 87 20 100 9 500 1373 250 2401 467
g3 63 8 1 17 100 9 500 664 333 1955 1539
g4 55 75 73 60 100 9 500 643 1611 588 1649
g5 5 64 93 40 100 9 500 548 891 1153 1899
g6 46 54 61 23 100 9 500 1135 706 1729 921
g7 89 53 82 92 100 9 500 502 1840 825 1324
g8 88 38 40 55 100 9 500 353 663 1443 2032
g9 40 76 91 23 100 9 500 1157 860 1366 1108
g10 69 5 13 33 100 9 500 443 465 995 2588
g11 5 0 0 5 5 12 300 837 913 907 931
§ g1 to g11 indicate game 1 to game 11, respectively. The
symbols A, B, C, D and S refer to Fig. 1. Group is the
number of the pairs of human subjects playing the games.
Rounds is the game repeated times in each pair.
B. Experimental Distributions of Transitions
According to the data set for each of the 11 games, using the definition in Sec. II C and IID, we can calculate
the actual experimental distributions of backward transitions and forward transitions. The results are summarized in
Table II, which should serve as the targets for testing MaxEnt.
C. Experimental Aggregated Transition for Each State
Numerically, x¯t±1 can be presented by two components (p¯t±1, q¯t±1). Using the definition in Sec. II E, results of all
of the components from experiments are shown in Table III. The vectors, x¯t±1, are shown in the sub-figures in Fig. 3.
5For calculating the theoretical backward (forward) distributions of the transitions from MaxEnt, x¯t−1 (x¯t+1) should
constraint the testing of MaxEnt.
TABLE II. Actual frequencies of the transitions of 11 games
T− g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
T00←00 464 764 184 314 124 529 143 111 606 116 196
T00←01 155 52 73 67 68 99 169 95 67 139 241
T00←10 274 504 327 193 207 382 89 70 362 123 182
T00←11 102 53 79 66 149 124 98 75 120 63 218
T01←00 55 86 35 239 213 226 104 11 263 43 149
T01←01 106 48 89 1054 217 311 1191 264 365 121 216
T01←10 78 69 100 70 191 86 66 62 85 55 231
T01←11 193 45 111 245 268 85 482 327 145 247 319
T10←00 401 446 383 45 51 235 145 169 144 232 281
T10←01 83 75 99 65 143 86 99 82 99 91 263
T10←10 1021 1722 1046 258 483 1029 478 858 691 370 191
T10←11 152 160 424 223 476 380 103 333 434 302 173
T11←00 74 77 62 45 160 145 110 62 144 52 211
T11←01 89 75 72 425 463 210 381 222 329 114 193
T11←10 286 106 482 67 272 232 192 453 228 447 303
T11←11 958 209 925 1115 1006 332 641 1297 409 1976 221
T+ g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
T00→00 464 764 184 314 124 529 143 111 606 116 196
T00→01 55 86 35 239 213 226 104 11 263 43 149
T00→10 401 446 383 45 51 235 145 169 144 232 281
T00→11 74 77 62 45 160 145 110 62 144 52 211
T01→00 155 52 73 67 68 99 169 95 67 139 241
T01→01 106 48 89 1054 217 311 1191 264 365 121 216
T01→10 83 75 99 65 143 86 99 82 99 91 263
T01→11 89 75 72 425 463 210 381 222 329 114 193
T10→00 274 504 327 193 207 382 89 70 362 123 182
T10→01 78 69 100 70 191 86 66 62 85 55 231
T10→10 1021 1722 1046 258 483 1029 478 858 691 370 191
T10→11 286 106 482 67 272 232 192 453 228 447 303
T11→00 102 53 79 66 149 124 98 75 120 63 218
T11→01 193 45 111 245 268 85 482 327 145 247 319
T11→10 152 160 424 223 476 380 103 333 434 302 173
T11→11 958 209 925 1115 1006 332 641 1297 409 1976 221
§ g1 indicates game 1, the rest analogize.
IV. THEORETICAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF TRANSITIONS FROM MAXENT
In this paper, in order to have a deeper insight in the dynamic social observable, we use the aggregated social
transitions (T±) as the constraints for MaxEnt testing. It is clear that for a given state, without MaxEnt, the
distribution of backward (forward) transitions can be arbitrary even given the constraints T± (two examples are
given in discussion).
For a given state xi0j0 , the x¯t−1 is assumed to be (p¯t−1, q¯t−1) and there is no other information. According
to MaxEnt suggested by Jaynes [20], the probability of the backward transitions from the states to xi0j0 can be
6TABLE III. Mean starting point x¯t−1 and terminal point x¯t+1
state x¯t−1 g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
x00 p¯t−1 0.38 0.41 0.61 0.40 0.65 0.45 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.48
q¯t−1 0.26 0.08 0.23 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.54 0.48 0.16 0.46 0.55
x01 p¯t−1 0.63 0.46 0.63 0.20 0.52 0.24 0.30 0.59 0.27 0.65 0.60
q¯t−1 0.69 0.38 0.6 0.81 0.55 0.56 0.91 0.89 0.59 0.79 0.58
x10 p¯t−1 0.71 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.70 0.83 0.82 0.68 0.40
q¯t−1 0.14 0.10 0.27 0.49 0.54 0.27 0.24 0.29 0.39 0.39 0.48
x11 p¯t−1 0.88 0.67 0.91 0.72 0.67 0.61 0.63 0.86 0.57 0.94 0.56
q¯t−1 0.74 0.61 0.65 0.93 0.77 0.59 0.77 0.75 0.66 0.81 0.45
state x¯t+1 g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
x00 p¯t+1 0.48 0.38 0.67 0.14 0.39 0.33 0.51 0.65 0.25 0.64 0.59
q¯t+1 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.44 0.68 0.33 0.43 0.21 0.35 0.21 0.43
x01 p¯t+1 0.40 0.60 0.51 0.30 0.68 0.42 0.26 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.50
q¯t+1 0.45 0.49 0.48 0.92 0.76 0.74 0.85 0.73 0.81 0.51 0.45
x10 p¯t+1 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.55 0.65 0.73 0.81 0.91 0.67 0.82 0.54
q¯t+1 0.22 0.07 0.30 0.23 0.40 0.18 0.31 0.36 0.23 0.5 0.59
x11 p¯t+1 0.79 0.79 0.88 0.81 0.78 0.77 0.56 0.80 0.76 0.88 0.42
q¯t+1 0.82 0.54 0.67 0.82 0.67 0.45 0.85 0.80 0.50 0.86 0.58
§ g1 indicates game 1, the rest analogize.
expressed, respectively, as
p(Ti0j0←00|x¯t−1) = (1− p¯t−1)
1−i(1− q¯t−1)
1−j
p(Ti0j0←01|x¯t−1) = q¯
j
t−1(1− p¯t−1)
1−i
p(Ti0j0←10|x¯t−1) = p¯
i
t−1(1− q¯t−1)
1−j
p(Ti0j0←11|x¯t−1) = p¯
i
t−1q¯
j
t−1
More compactly, the probability of backward transitions from xij to xi0j0 , can be expressed as,
p(Ti0j0←ij |x¯t−1) = p¯
i
t−1(1− p¯t−1)
1−iq¯
j
t−1(1− q¯t−1)
1−j , (1)
in which {i, j} ∈ {0, 1}. Similarly, for x¯i0j0 and its x¯t+1=(p¯t+1, q¯t+1), the probability of the forward transition from
xi0j0 to state xij can be expressed as
p(Ti0j0→ij |x¯t+1) = p¯
i
t+1(1− p¯t+1)
1−iq¯
j
t+1(1− q¯t+1)
1−j , (2)
in which {i, j} ∈ {0, 1} too.
Comparing to experimental distributions directly, the theoretical probabilities are multiplied by the observation
Ωi0j0 (referring to Table I) to gain the theoretical distributions. Fig. 2 (c) provides an example to illustrate the
theoretical distribution of backward transitions using the x¯t−1 in Fig. 2 (b) and Eq. 1; Similarly, Fig. 2 (g) illustrates
the theoretical distribution of forward transitions using x¯t+1 in Fig. 2 (f) and Eq. 2; Multiplied factor Ω refers to the
figure in last 4 columns of Table I.
In summary, according to Eq. 1 and Eq. 2, together with Tab III as constraints, theoretical probabilities of the
transitions can be obtained. Multiplied by the observation Ω at the given state, the distribution of the transitions
can be obtained and listed in Table IV.
V. RESULTS
To test MaxEnt is to evaluate the goodness of fit between the experimental data (in Table II) and theoretical data
(in Table IV).
Fig. 3 plots the results of observed experimental transition frequencies (in horizon, x-axis) and theoretical transition
frequencies(vertical, y-axis). The first figure is the results for all 11 games, and from second to last is game 1 to game
7TABLE IV. Expected transitions frequencies of 11 game by MaxEnt
T− g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
T00←00 459 754 198 302 116 505 145 106 564 138 197
T00←01 160 62 59 79 76 124 167 100 109 117 240
T00←10 279 514 313 205 215 407 87 75 404 101 181
T00←11 97 43 93 54 141 100 100 70 78 85 219
T01←00 50 84 50 248 195 237 119 30 255 34 152
T01←01 111 50 74 1045 235 300 1176 245 373 130 213
T01←10 83 71 85 61 209 75 51 43 93 64 228
T01←11 188 43 126 254 250 96 497 346 137 238 322
T10←00 415 470 353 56 90 235 184 179 148 195 283
T10←01 69 51 129 54 104 86 60 72 95 128 261
T10←10 1007 1698 1076 247 444 1030 439 848 687 407 189
T10←11 166 184 394 234 515 380 142 343 438 265 175
T11←00 42 60 47 32 142 146 112 72 159 32 224
T11←01 121 92 87 438 481 209 379 212 314 134 180
T11←10 318 123 497 80 290 231 190 443 213 467 290
T11←11 926 192 910 1102 988 3 33 643 1307 424 1956 234
T+ g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
T00→00 452 749 187 309 108 508 142 v97 563 125 197
T00→01 67 101 32 244 229 247 105 25 306 34 148
T00→10 413 461 380 50 67 256 146 183 187 223 280
T00→11 62 62 65 40 144 124 109 48 101 61 212
T01→00 143 51 84 92 67 107 198 96 83 129 252
T01→01 118 49 78 1029 218 303 1162 263 349 131 205
T01→10 95 76 88 40 144 78 70 81 83 101 252
T01→11 77 74 83 450 462 218 410 223 345 104 204
T10→00 275 531 300 202 238 382 107 85 345 88 170
T10→01 77 42 127 61 160 86 48 47 102 90 243
T10→10 1020 1695 1073 249 452 1029 460 843 708 405 203
T10→11 287 133 455 76 303 232 210 468 211 412 291
T11→00 53 45 62 55 137 114 88 81 133 44 226
T11→01 242 53 128 256 280 95 492 321 133 266 311
T11→10 201 168 441 234 488 390 113 327 422 321 165
T11→11 909 201 908 1104 994 322 631 1303 422 1957 229
§ g1 indicates game 1, the rest analogize.
11, respectively. For each game, there are 32 samples of social strategy transitions. The cycles in blue indicate
the backward transitions and the crosses in red indicate the forward transitions. Significantly, all of the backward
transition samples (blue cycles) and forward transitions samples (red crosses) are close to the diagonal lines which
means theoretical values from MaxEnt are close to experimental values.
The liner regression results are shown in TableV. Obliviously, each of the liner regression coefficients is very close
to 1 and the p < 0.001. TableV also provides the 99% C.I. (confidence interval) both for liner regression coefficients
and intercept constant. All the lower bound of 99% C.I. of regression coefficients are smaller than but very close to
1 and the upper bound are larger than but also very close to 1; then the equal hypothesis of the two variables can
not be rejected. Meanwhile, for intercept constant (y-intercept, the point where a line crosses the y-axis), none of
the p value is smaller than 0.42, all of the lower bound of the 99% C.I. are smaller than 0 and all of the upper bound
are larger than 0. Then, the hypothesis that the regression line cross 0 can not be rejected. These statistical results
indicate that the hypothesis that theoretical values statistically equal to experimental observation of the transitions
is supported.
In summary, in the laboratory experimental two-person constant sum 2×2 games, the outcome of the social transi-
tions fit MaxEnt. In another word, given the mean vector of the transitions of a given state, the distributions of the
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FIG. 3. Comparison of the actual transition frequencies with expected transition frequencies in the experimental games.
Horizonal axis is the expected transition frequencies from MaxEnt hypothesis; meanwhile, vertical axis is the actual transition
frequencies. The first figure is the results of all 11 games. Figure 2nd to last is for game 1 to game 11, respectively. In the
first figure, symbol B (F) in the legend indicates backward (forward). For each game, there are four social states and 16 kinds
of social forward transitions and 16 kinds of backward transitions. The cycles in blue (cross in red) indicate the backward
transitions (forward transitions). A dot in diagonal line means the experimental transition frequencies equal to the theoretical
transition frequencies. The sub-figures in the right down corners are the schematic diagrams for aggregated backward (forward)
transitions in blue arrows (in red arrows).
all transitions of the given state can be estimated with MaxEnt, and fit experiments data exactly.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The main result of this report is that, the social strategy transitions are not erratic but governed by MaxEnt
suggested by Jaynes [19]. This result comes from the dynamical observables in the experiments of human subject
competing games [14, 36].
A. Examples of the Necessary of MaxEnt
To make the MaxEnt in social dynamics easier to understand, we provides two alternative examples in Fig. 2;
The first example is in sub-figure (d), the backward transition distribution, which is consistent with the aggregated
backward transition shown in (b) but not capture the experiment result in (a); In another word, in (d), the frequencies
for T00←01, T00←00, T00←10 and T00←11 could be 133, 28, 0 and 271; Even though this distribution satisfied the
constraint condition (b), it is far away from the experimental distribution in (a). Second example is for forward state
9TABLE V. Results of linear regression for T− and T+ of each game
Coef. T−† [99%C.I]§ const. [99%C.I]‡ Coef. T+† [99%C.I]§ const. [99%C.I]‡
g1 1.019 0.971 1.067 -24.497 13.829 1.020 0.950 1.090 -33.665 22.369
g2 1.010 0.982 1.039 -17.453 11.596 1.012 0.983 1.041 -17.993 11.337
g3 0.995 0.943 1.047 -19.863 22.717 0.997 0.952 1.041 -17.420 19.273
g4 1.009 0.981 1.037 -14.445 9.388 1.013 0.978 1.048 -18.533 11.146
g5 1.005 0.922 1.088 -31.300 28.440 1.007 0.942 1.072 -25.466 21.471
g6 1.002 0.956 1.049 -17.457 16.123 1.003 0.961 1.045 -16.216 14.447
g7 1.012 0.954 1.070 -26.656 19.858 1.017 0.970 1.065 -23.895 14.080
g8 0.997 0.968 1.026 -11.762 13.329 1.000 0.974 1.026 -11.121 11.139
g9 1.009 0.909 1.110 -36.096 30.798 1.006 0.894 1.118 -38.853 35.654
g10 1.008 0.966 1.050 -24.502 20.038 1.009 0.972 1.045 -21.852 16.953
g11 1.002 0.886 1.119 -27.159 26.109 1.011 0.848 1.175 -39.890 34.780
total 1.007 0.995 1.019 -6.700 2.889 1.009 0.997 1.020 -7.170 2.317
† liner regression coefficient.
§ 99% Confident Interval for liner regression coefficient.
‡ 99% Confident Interval for intercept constant.
transition in (h); without MaxEnt, a plausible distribution like the (h) in Fig. 2 does not provide efficient information
of experimental dynamical observable in (e) with the constraint condition of (f). Alternatively, with MaxEnt, results
in (c) and (g), by using (b) and (f) as the constraints, can recover the experimental distribution in (a) and (e),
respectively.
B. MaxEnt in social state transition and experimental social dynamics
In this section, we explain the connection of present results to the results found in experimental social dynamics.
The social dynamics of human subjects systems is an interdisciplinary field [10, 17, 24, 37]. In this field, evolutionary
game theory provides a general mathematical framework for the theoretical investigation of social dynamics and is used
commonly by physicists and economics. However, this theory has rare gain the supports from laboratory experiments1
of human subject social systems quantitatively.
Only quite recently, according to the three reports from three independent research groups, quantitative experimen-
tal testing on evolutionary dynamics is becoming possible. The three reports are following. (1) The first is the report
from Hoffman, Suetens, Nowak and Gneezy (2012) [18]. In three Rock-paper-scissors games, the authors compare
behavior with three different symmetric matrices whose mean distances from identical Nash equilibrium (NE) are
equal (unequal) in classical (evolutionary) game theory. They find the mean distance from NE in a treatment is larger
which is predicted by replicator dynamics model in evolutionary game theory. This is the first experimental report to
support one of the most fundamental concept — Evolutionarily stable state (ESS) — in evolutionary game theory. In
their report, the simplest replicator dynamics model is used as a reference. (2) The second is the report from Cason,
Friedman and Hopkins (2012) [8]. Using continuous time experiments, also in Rock-Paper-Scissors games, the authors
found cycles directly. More Importantly, they found that the cycle amplitude, frequency and direction are consistent
with standard learning models2. In their report [8], the logit dynamics model is used as a reference. Another important
point is ”time” are served as controlled variable in their experiments. (3) The third are the report from Xu, Wang and
Wang (2012) [32]. In two-population random-matched 2×2 games with 12 different payoff-matrix parameters [25],
the experimental frequencies is found to be linear positive related to the theoretical frequencies significant (>5σ).
The payoff-normalized replicator dynamics model is used as the reference. Together with the observed cyclic velocity
vector field pattern in experiments [33], evidences from 2×2 games support the evolutionary game theory as well. To
test evolutionary dynamics in laboratory human subject social systems, these are the three experiments which are
reported recently.
1 One point need to emphasis, most of the experiments are conducted by the social scientists in the field called as experimental economics.
All the experiments are the incentivized laboratory experiment using human subjects. Traditional experimental testing on social
dynamics mainly focus on the convergence property of the equilibrium (e.g., [6, 11, 12, 27]). Early experiments had demonstrated
the qualitative consistence between the evolutionary dynamics and laboratory social behaviors [3, 13, 16, 29] but not the quantitative
consistence. In experiment data, as pointed out [5], it is difficult to test out the dynamics patterns (e.g., cycles [5, 8]) which are predicted
by evolutionary game theory.
2 This findings of cycles in Rock-Paper-Scissors games [8] are supported by the discrete time experiments of three different parameters
Rock-Paper-Scissors games [34, 35] from an independent research group.
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Notice that, all the three groups use accumulated observable (macro observable) to describe the social dynamics
behaviors. In this letter, the macro observable which are used as the constraint conditions (e.g., the mean aggregated
forward transition) are also macro observable. In this letter, we show that MaxEnt can provides more dynamics
information (micro observable, the state-to-state transits) from the limited accumulated observable (macro observable)
in the experiments.
In words, present report might provide a paradigm — the micro and macro dynamical observable could be linked
by MaxEnt in social dynamical processes in experiments. We suggest the results reported in this letter could be
replicated in more general conditions in the experiments of human subject social dynamics.
C. MaxEnt as a Link between Nature and Social Science
In economics, MaxEnt approach has gained its widely applications, e.g., in market equilibrium [2, 28], in wealth and
income distribution [9, 31], in firm growth rates [1] in behavior modeling [30]. Theoretical interpreting or modeling
of the distributions of social outcomes with MaxEnt is growing.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the dynamic behavior (both of the backward and forward transitions)
obeys MaxEnt — this point has never been empirical presented. Our finding of the MaxEnt in dynamic behaviors in
experimental data can be an encourage information for investigating the potential self-consistence of social outcome
— both in static and dynamic performance.
MaxEnt, as a technique, can be used to predict the geographic distribution of any spatial phenomena, including
plants and animals [22]. In game theory condition, the spatial phenomena of social behavior is the phenomena in
strategy space, at the same time, the absence or appearance of strategy is relative to the absence or appearance of
species. This picture has been well built [24] to unify the evolutionary theorems in biology science and social science.
Our findings of the social behavior fitting MaxEnt, both in dynamic respect in this report and in static respect in [36],
suggest that human subject social systems and natural systems could have wider common backgrounds.
For the future investigations, several points need to be considered. As we have shown in static [36] and in one step
(xt±1) dynamics social behaviors obey MaxEnt, dose any step transitions always obey MaxEnt? What is the bound
of the MaxEnt in social interaction systems?
One can notice that, in the 11 games, all the social environments are different (for the payoff matrix are different), all
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium are different, however, all the social transitions obeying MexEnt are indifferent.
D. Conclusion
By employing experimental economics data, we test the MaxEnt hypothesis in social transitions. In the experi-
mental constant sum two-person 2×2 games, the results show that, not only static social state distributions obey
MaxEnt [36], the distributions of the social state transitions also fit MaxEnt. This finding suggests that MaxEnt can
also be an approach for the social dynamics.
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